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moral (and liberal) grammar of social conflicts 
 
Facundo Calegari* 
 
 
“[…] one must necessarily consider the 
additional fact that subjects must, in some way, 
have already recognized each other even before 
the conflict” 
Axel Honneth, in The Struggle for Recognition: 
the moral grammar of social conflicts. 
 
Abstract 
 
In the present article I will  uphold that Honneth´s version of the theory of 
recognition (as a logical consequence of Hegel´s concept of ´Sittl ichkeit´) has 
relevant dimensions for the analysis of social conflicts and for the 
development of social theory in general. I will  analyze the arguments in 
favor of a “normative” content for social theory and I will  argue, following 
Honneth, that the main cause of conflict in the theory of recognition works 
as a critic of the classic model of conflict in modern social thought (the 
model of material “survival” in Machiavelli  and Hobbes). Later, I will  outline 
the core characteristics that this theory may acquire in the discussion of the 
communitarian possibil ities in democratic l ife. Lastly, I will  point out in the 
conclusions the main advantages and potentialities that the theory of 
recognition could eventually gain in every intellectual or politi cal 
conversation that intent to engage current democratic shapes: in this sense, 
I think it is possible to affirm that this theory is a fundamental input in the 
task of shaping a l iberal conception of social conflicts. 
Keywords: recognition, identity, democracy, society, l iberalism. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The characterizations of machiavelian-hobbesian classical republicanism and 
the cosmovisions that, engaging the problems of the republic, addresses conflict as an 
essential feature for modern politics are truly consistent and broadly accepted in the 
community of those who analyze politics. Nevertheless, a significant number of 
exegetes of modern republicanism shows a systematic shortcoming that makes 
impossible any extended analysis about the roles of conflict in every process of social 
reproduction: most of the time, it seems to be a priority for this perspectives the 
elevation of conflict as an irreducible, univocal engine of everything that is possible 
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inside the limits of associated life. Anyway, it is possible to argue, in a theoretical and 
practical manner, the existence of other suggestive ways of talking about conflicts. A 
priori, any alternative should attempt to answer if the classical republican theories of 
conflict are constituted as an structural limit to the experience of politics or if they 
rather show an element of political community (conflict) that lives along but doesn´t 
override other fundamental aspects of the legitimacy in social order: I am referring to 
recognition and cooperation, as suggested by Axel Honneth (1996, 1997). 
As human beings and conscious subjects we owe a good part of our integrity to 
several forms of recognition or reciprocal approval by other human beings. This means 
that when we perceive that we are recognized by others like us, we believe that we are 
closer of personal self-development. On the contrary, when that same perception has 
a negative content we tend to think that the lack of recognition to our identity is so 
degrading that, at the end, represents the impossibility of our development as human 
beings. Here is when it becomes necessary to say that the lack of recognition do not 
end in the regular material “distribution” from modern political thought: it is mostly 
about ways of degradation directly associated to intersubjective , conscious and largely 
moral relations. Moreover, taking the argument further, it becomes valid the 
introduction of the following question: is it sufficient for a theory of justice, or even for 
a practical justice, to be limited to the ways in which societies distribute material 
goods? Any society that is able to maintain functional its pattern of “material” 
distribution will surely be confronted with the problem implied by many subjects or 
even groups not having the recognition they want for themselves. Underlying this idea 
there is an ethical principle arguing that every form of recognition is vital for 
democracy, if we agree to understand it as a way of life. And Axel Honneth thinks 
about democracy as such.  
Between those who advocate the hermeneutic of Hegel´s works there is a 
significant consensus on the importance of the “Phenomenology of the Spirit” 
(Phänomenologie des Geistes) (Hegel, 1993) as a corner stone of his thought. A 
substantial part of this consensus would also sustain that the so ca lled “theory of 
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recognition”1, the theoretical scheme of social conflicts based on the forms of moral 
recognition between human beings who share a common life, never exercised a 
significant relevance in Hegelian thought. The main reason for this could be found in 
the fact that Hegel´s early works remained a long time in the shadow of the 
indisputable kingdom of the “Phänomenologie des Geistes”, a much more 
sophisticated work in terms of method and abstraction which subsumed it all to the 
exam of self-consciousness and absolute spirit (Hegel, 1993). But Axel Honneth is 
located among those who would interpose a well-established objection to that trend, 
presenting his theory as an attempt to actualize Hegel´s theory of right – in the Jena 
period or Jenaer Rechtsphilosophie – that pushes us to the challenge of re-reading 
social conflicts as ways of the struggle for human recognition in almost every of its 
expressions. Among many other things, this theory sustains that the careful lecture of 
these social signs would be useful in the task of reaffirming the ideal and the practice 
of an ethical life for society as a whole. It is not only about a defense of individuality, 
autonomy nor the integration of individuals to the democratic life, but also a 
representation of the chance of considering society –and social theory- from its 
inherent normativity. This means, from a normativity that understands as a basic 
premise two basic premises: first, the fact that associated life requires that every 
individual should have real chances to self-develop; and secondly, that every individual 
must be recognized by a basic felling of mutual esteem as a precondition for the 
formation of the identity. 
Now, the theory of recognition finds a clear antecedent in the concept of 
´Sittlichkeit´ developed by Hegel in his early works. According to Hegel (1982), 
Sittlichkeit, means the sum of obligations, norms and social values to which human 
beings are attached in the context of common life. Normally translated as ´ethic life´ or 
´concrete ethics´, it is a fact that this concept not only holds the Hegelian critic to the 
                                                 
1 As Joel Anderson remarks in the introduction to the English edition of Honneth, Axel. “The Struggle for 
Recognition: the moral grammar of social conflicts”, MIT Press, Great Britain, 1996, the concept of 
recognition will  always be referred to the possession or concession of a specific status –both from an 
individual or from a sociological point of view. This is due to the fact that, in German, “recognition” 
(Anerkennung) means basically the attribution of certain characteristics or positive attributes. Also, the 
impossibil ity or denial of recognition will  be understood as “disrespect” (Mißachtung).  
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Kantian notion of ´Moralität´2: its central features also present the conception of 
individuality not as a sheer sum of isolated atoms (Hegel thought that utilitarianism 
conceived individuality in such manner), but rather as a part in a wider relationship 
that shows how the individual and the community are merged in a basic organic way, 
in which every identity formation process requires a social component. In short, 
subjectivity is what it is according to the social and cultural identity assumed by 
individuals in common life. Indeed, the main feature implies a very simple idea in an 
analytical context, but also significantly powerful in its practical consequences. 
According to this, a subject needs interaction with others in the process of identity 
formation: associated life would be, in all possible dimensions, the chance of self -
development through three main forms of recognition. In the first place, love (Liebe), 
that includes friendly and affective relationships; secondly, right (Recht), that includes 
the institutionalization of the norms of acceptance between human beings; and 
thirdly, solidarity (Solidarität), understood as the possibility for society to recognize all 
forms of subjective inputs to the whole set of share values. Altogether, these three 
forms of recognition would imply, ultimately, the subjective perception of self -
confidence, (Selbstvertrauen), self-respect (Selbstachtung) and self-esteem 
(Selbstshätzung). Without a doubt, it is a sort of theoretical temperament in which 
subjectivity is not about absolute isolation, but instead it is considered from an “inter-
subjective” approach according to the contributions of G. H. Mead (2009) and G. W. F. 
Hegel (1993). 
 
Hereinafter, I will try to show that the theory of recognition in Axel Honneth´s 
version contains relevant dimensions for the analysis of social conflicts and for the 
development of social theory in general. In the next paragraph I will analyze the 
arguments in favor of a normative content for social theory and how, according to 
Honneth, the main cause of conflicts becomes constituted as a critic of the classic 
                                                 
2 As Charles Taylor put it: “Societies refer to the theoretical ´value´ formulations as their norms rather 
than to practices, when they are trying to make themselves over to meet an unrealized standard; e. g. 
they are trying to ´build socialism´, or become fully ´democratic´. But these goals are, of course, of the 
domain of ´Moralität´. ´Sittlichkeit´ presupposes that the living practices are an adequate ´statement´ of 
the basic norms […] Hence we see the importance of Hegel´s insistence that the end sought by the 
highest ethics is already realized”.  Sandel, Michael. “Liberalism and its Critics”, New York University 
Press, 1984, p. 185. 
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model of conflict (the model of physical “survival” and material competition in the 
thought of Machiavelli, 1984a and 1984b; and Hobbes, 1994). Next, I will outline the 
main characteristics that this theory acquires regarding the discussion of the common 
possibilities in democratic life. In the conclusions, I will sustain that the advantages 
related to the theory of recognition could eventually become powerful in every 
intellectual or practical conversation that intends to engage the shapes of democracy 
in our times: in this sense, I think it is possible to say that the theory of recognition is a 
fundamental piece of work in the task of achieving a liberal conception of social 
conflicts. 
 
Two fundamental features in the theory of recognition: 
normativity and the moral grammar of social conflicts 
 
One of the most important features within the social and political thought of 
Axel Honneth resides in the fact that his attempts to establish a corner stone in the 
construction of a normative theory made him recognize that the proper way to do it is 
on the basis of a “grammar” of social conflicts. In this attempt, the importance of self-
development carried with itself normative dimensions that generally were 
marginalized by modern political thought. This is one of the most important aspects in 
Honneth´s contribution to social theory, and I shall explain why. 
 When Honneth analyses at the classic political philosophy of Machiavelli 
and Hobbes, he concludes that those schemes had provided a set of intellectual 
temperaments to study social conflicts. Those temperaments are characterized by its 
complexity and variety, although in all of them the paradigm was dominated by the 
notion of a struggle for material and physical “survival”, carrying within a negative 
conception of man, which is supposed to be considered selfish and violent by nature. 
The breakthrough of modern political philosophy inside the thought of Niccolò 
Machiavelli had established a new mode of conceiving human nature: in it, man was 
placed as a pivot in every process of associated living, which ultimately meant an 
abrupt break in respect to the theological explanations prevailing until that time. It 
seems clear that, for Machiavelli, men share a common life because they have natural 
needs and not because of a social or more positive anthropology within humanity. To 
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sum up, and if it is possible to broadly characterize that particular conception of men, 
it becomes necessary to realize that Machiavelli was thinking in a hostile nature of 
human beings3, giving place to what Leo Strauss called “the context of the 
Machiavellian realism” (Strauss, 1972), in which a common and shared life becomes 
wrapped by the selfishness of men as a “natural base of politics” (Hilb, 2005). In his 
canonic work called “The Prince” (Machiavelli, 1984a), human nature seems to be 
connoted in regard to the volatility and ingratitude of men, and even in the Discorsi 
(Machiavelli, 1984b), this same general idea prevailed. Of course, this central feature 
of modern political philosophy, in which it becomes impossible to stop the evilness of 
mankind4, comes from the abrupt dissociation between human nature and its morals 
in the way it was known in the horizon of ancient politics –this is to say, the classic 
summum bonum in the thought of Plato and Epicure5. The evolution of political 
thought indicates that the renunciation of such hostile nature, as is expressed in the 
thought of Thomas Hobbes, is crucial for men to avoid that chaotic and violent world 
through the institution of the Leviathan, the biblical monster capable of maintaining 
men inside the limits of law and to provide the conditions for the reproduction of the 
political life (Hobbes, 1994).  
 But this modern tradition shows some controversial dimensions that in 
some cases are serious limitations: this is why Honneth was forced to justify his 
approach to a mode of conceiving social conflicts that emphasizes the analysis of 
mutual recognition. From Honneth´s perspective, although in the works of Machiavelli 
and Hobbes it is clear that humanity is involved in a constant struggle for self -
preservation, that doesn´t realize the fact that the contractual hypothesis –this is, the 
idea of a contract between individuals that puts an end to physical violence and makes 
                                                 
3 See, for instance, Michael Oakesshott, “Dr. Leo Strauss on Hobbes” (1937), in: Hobbes on Civil 
Association, Oxford, Basil  Blackwell, 1975.  
4 The following passage clarifies this argument: “The Hobbesian understanding of political philosophy -of 
its necessity and possibility- implies a profound transformation of its purpose: it is now called to solve the 
problem of the human condition on earth, to solve the problem of the update of a just social ord er. In the 
classical view, the impossibility of the right order is, ultimately, inextricably linked to the impossible 
realization of the good: the cessation of evil is impossible", Hilb, ob. Cit. P. 140).  Also, as a main 
characteristic of modern age, Strauss affirms that a “just city” is impossible by its own nature, simply 
because it becomes impossible to stop evilness: see, Strauss, Leo. The City and Man, Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 1978.   
5 The dissociation of the classical summum bonum is mentioned by Leo Strauss in Natural Right and 
History, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1972.). 
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it possible for men to start living in a legal and egalitarian society under the rule of the 
sovereign- contains some sorts of conflicts that are “grammatically” moral: starting 
from the Hegelian critic to the natural state and the contract among individuals, 
Honneth remarks that individuals necessarily have to recognize themselves and others 
even before the mere act of contracting. Individuals, in the context of that violent 
hostility that has been taking them to a constant antagonism of the natural state, 
recognize themselves even before the materialization of conflict, which supposes a 
kind of recognition of “the other” as a partner in action: “[…] conflict in the state of 
nature presupposes an implicit agreement between subjects, one that consists in the 
affirmation of the each other as partners to interaction” (Honneth, 1996:46)6. 
 Now, although the primary objective of Honneth isn´t the rejection “in toto” 
of this materialistic way of conceiving conflicts that results as a consequence of the 
irruption of Machiavelli and Hobbes into the modern thought, his attempt wants to 
broaden the scope of this classic model by including some alternative dimensions for 
the consideration of conflict: it is here where it becomes possible the idea of a 
normative theory through the concept of “recognition” (Anerkennung). In this 
intellectual temperament, the early works of G. W. F. Hegel are crucial, mainly because 
his theory of individuality gets inserted in a context of constant struggle for the 
recognition of rights and solidarities that are relevant in every process of the 
individual´s seek for autonomy7. Additionally, some contributions from the 
psychological theory of George Herbert Mead (2009) are complemented along with 
the Hegelian system to give shape to the central lines of Honneth´s theory. In fact, the 
honnethian twist to a kind of “naturalism” present in Mead´s thought turns to be vital 
                                                 
6 It should be emphasized that the opportunities offered by Honneth in relation to the nature of social 
conflicts represents an additional dimension of signi ficant importance. The consideration of the moral 
grammar of social conflicts and the critics to the modern political philosophy of Machiavelli  and Hobbes 
which follows from there also serves to locate Honneth´s critic to the "materialism" of the Frankfurt 
School. According to Joel Anderson, in the introduction of the capital work of Honneth : “[…] the 
Frankfurt School suffered from an exclusive focus on the domain of material production as the locus of 
transformative critique. In the present volume, he now proposes and alternative account, situating the 
critical perception of injustice more generally within individuals´ negative experiences of having their 
broadly ´moral´ expectations violated”. Ob. Cit. p. xi. 
7 One more time, Joel Anderson, clarifies the argument: “Honneth takes from Hegel the idea that full 
human flourishing is dependent of the existence of well established, ´ethical´ relations –in particular, 
relations of love, law and ´ethical life´ [Sittlichkeit]- which can only be established through a struggle for 
recognition”, Ibid. p. 11. 
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to get rid of the metaphysical and phenomenological aspects of Hegel´s thought, 
achieving a “materialistic” anchorage that escapes from the philosophy of 
consciousness pursued by Hegel in his “Phenomenology”  (1993)8. Mead´s thought 
acquires a significant worth because it emphasizes the importance of experience as a 
creative context in which human beings develop their practices and ideas. His social 
psychology carried a very novel “intersubjective” perception until it became the corner 
stone of a coherent and systemic theory. This particular way of thinking about psycho-
social dimensions within society had exposed that individuals forge their practical 
identities depending, almost entirely, on the possibility of being recognized by others: 
this is how identity depends fundamentally on the adoption of those practical and 
common attitudes usually called “shared values”. Social structure resides, then, in 
those habits that are the main explanation for the constitution for both individual and 
society (Mead, 2009:125-126). 
It is a way of perceiving the identity formation process in which the principle of 
social organization is not “physiologic”, or you may say, “mechanic”, but rather reflects 
the outcome of the symbolic intercommunication and the human participation in the 
cultural legacy surrounding mankind. Furthermore, human communication gets 
installed in a universal speech that inhibits the existence of pure individual speeches 
and that supposes a large and varied amount of communications constituted through 
intersubjectivity, so the gestural exercise of language takes a relevant part in social life, 
specially because it was there where it was born and it is there where its “self” is  
(Mead, 2009). Even self-consciousness and its intrinsic relation with socialization 
became relevant for this way of conceiving the process of identity formation. And 
there, in the very core of social action, are located both individuality and community: 
above other aspects of Mead´s thought, stands the way in which his social psycholog y 
                                                 
8 Honneth is aware that under the shadow of the Phenomenology of Spirit, the possibil ities of the theory 
of recognition were reduced to its minimum expressions: “[…] one would need to assume that the sort of 
intersubjectivist concept of ´ethical life´ that, after Hegel´s transition to a philosophy of consciousness is 
virtually completed is no longer available to him. […] The Phenomenology of Spirit allots to the struggle 
for recognition –once the moral forces that drove the process of Spirit´s socialization through each of its 
stages- the sole function of the formation of self- consciousness. Thus reduced to the single meaning 
represented in the dialectic of lordship and bondage, the struggle between subjects fighting  for 
recognition then comes to be linked so closely to the experience of the practical acknowledgement of 
one´s labor that its own particular logic disappears almost entirely from view”. Ibid. p. 62-63. 
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gives a practical component to the struggle for recognition that was suggested by 
Hegel. For instance, Honneth sees as it follows: “What re-emerged in Mead, in the 
altered form of an empirical hypothesis, was not only the general premise of the early 
Hegel -that practical identity-formation presupposes intersubjective recognition- but 
also postmetaphysical, naturalistic equivalents for the conceptual distinctions among 
various stages of recognition and even the wide-reaching assertion of a struggle 
mediating between these stages” (Honneth, 1996:92). Taken together, the 
contributions of Hegel and Mead constitute a practical and theoretical tool that allows 
the analysis of the conditions under which human beings produce and reproduce their 
own identities mediated by the logic of a “grammar” of social conflicts. Now I will 
summarize in the following paragraphs, although briefly taking into account more 
relevant goals, the three patterns of intersubjective recognition proposed by Honneth. 
The theoretical elements found in Hegel and Mead allowed Honneth to shape a 
theory whose first attempt turns to be the description of cultural change and social 
conflicts as a result of the normative demands attached to mutual relations of 
recognition. Now, for such a theory to be useful in a hypothetical context -this is, a 
factual context- must necessarily be operational in relation to primary facts of 
associated living (a priori, it may be said that this was missing in Hegel and Mead). 
Honneth path´s turns to be a triad of patterns of recognition: love (Liebe), right 
(Recht), and solidarity (Solidarität). In the first place, love (Liebe) is constituted for 
Honneth as a central dimension for individuals to express their needs and desires of 
experiencing primary relations, either friendship, erotic, or in its clearest example, the 
mother-son relationship9: “[…] love represents the first stage of reciprocal recognition, 
because in it subjects mutually confirm each other with regard to the concrete nature 
of their needs and thereby recognize each other as needy creatures” (Honneth, 
1996:95). This kind of relations represents a period in the identity formation process 
which denotes a fundamental human need that is reflected in the mandatory 
characteristic of any loving relation, and those relations are mandatory simply because 
                                                 
9 This way of conceiving primary loving relations shows the influence of psychoanalytic theory inside 
Honneth´s thought: “In the object-relations theory, conclusions are drawn, on the basis of the 
therapeutic analysis of relational pathologies, as to the conditions that can lead to a successful form of 
emotional attachment to other persons” (1996:96). 
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their acceptance or rejection are fundamental for human identity. And under certain 
circumstances, the rejection of a relation of this kind means a severe violation, 
sometimes irreversible, to the rejected individual. Ultimately, this first pattern of 
recognition provides -or denies- the possibility of self-confidence (Selbstvertrauen), 
which supposes that individuals clinch their knowledge to themselves and to the 
others: in Hegel´s view, it is about the chance of “the self in the other” (Hegel, 1982). 
In the second place, right (Recht) represents the moment in which an individual 
recognizes the basic norms and obligations attached to society. Here, human beings 
recognize themselves as legal subjects, and legality supposes a set of obligations and 
responsibilities within the community: “[…] only once we have taken the perspective of 
the “generalized other”, which teaches us to recognize the other members of the 
community as the bearers of rights, can we also understand ourselves to be legal 
persons, in the sense that we can be sure that certain of our claims will be met”  
(Honneth, 1996:108). From this point of view, individuals understand the legal system 
both as a result of the generalized recognition of the interests of the whole community 
and as related to a moral self-perception of a man facing the law. So, when an 
individual recognizes the relations between the rights and the responsibilities attached 
to those rights, it is possible to achieve self-respect (Selbstachtung), understood as a 
reciprocal dimension of the moral conscience of an individual. 
In the third place, solidarity (Solidarität) represents a way of social valuation 
that is developed in a much more dense and deeper aspect of associated living, after 
love and right were recognized and achieved as such: “[…] in order to be able to 
acquire an undistorted relation-to-self, human subjects always need –over and above 
the experience of affectionate care and legal recognition- a form of social esteem that 
allows them to relate positively to their concrete traits and abilities”  (Honneth, 
1996:121). Solidarity, then, represents for Honneth the chance for individuals to 
participate in the cultural formation of their own time, developing their peculiarities 
and personal talents in the wider possible plenitude. This means that each individual 
must acknowledge that their contributions are considered positively, either by a social 
group in which the individual anchors their sense of solidarity or by the community as 
a macro-social instance. Given that, solidarity can be understood as the way individuals 
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sympathize with the talents and abilities of their equals, contributing this way to the 
strengthening of the self-esteem (Selbstschätzung) necessary for their own dignity. 
Now, a social theory that sets its foundation around the idea of a set of social 
conflicts that are linked directly to recognition requires, in turn, further considerations 
on the nature of democracy and community life. And it can be said that an important 
aspect of the normativity of this intellectual temperament lies unequivocally in its 
deeply ethical and communitarian conception of democratic life. In the following 
conclusions I will outline some definitions over the shapes and limits of such 
conception of democratic life. 
 
Conclusions: community and democracy in the political horizon of 
the theory of recognition 
 
From the previous analysis of Hegel´s and Honneth´s contributions one can 
easily state that democracy, according to both, is an ideal and a practice in which the 
universal goals of equality and individual self-development are forged in the patterns 
of intersubjective recognition of love, right and solidarity. What is 
more, Honneth shows his Hegelian influences to the extent that it ceases to conceive 
public life as the result of the classical constraints in the areas of autonomy 
and individual liberty10 and starts affirming the importance of organic "unity” under 
which liberty becomes possible for each individual. This conception of the unity within 
social life suggests that any systematic form of thought couldn´t start by characterizing 
radically isolated individuals, but rather must begin with the moral ties that bind 
them together: “Thus, contrary to atomistic theories of society, one is to assume, as a 
kind of natural basis for human socialization, a situation in which elementary forms of 
intersubjective coexistence are always present” (Honneth, 1996:14)11. Indeed, 
Honneth emphasizes the imperative need for individuals to be consciously and 
                                                 
10 Probably, the best characterization of this way of conceiving l iberty is to be found in one of the 
contemporary classics of l iberal thought: Berlin, Isaiah. Four Essays on Liberty, (1990), Oxford University 
Press, USA. 
11 This eloquent Hegelian influence in Honneth is probably one of the most important signs that took 
John Dewey to the systematic appreciation of the “organic” theory within Hegel. For further analysis on 
this topic, see, for instance, Ryan, Alan. John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism, Norton 
and Company, New York, 1997. 
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cooperatively recognized as free and autonomous in every human and creative 
activity, including of course political life. There, in the “polis”, individuals recognize 
themselves as concrete and specific human beings, and even the possibility of affecting  
recognition is to be considered as  a heavy injury that impacts negatively on the 
perception they have over themselves: this means that, in the context of a common 
life, there are some stages of recognition and some stages of conflict, giving place to a 
contingent conception of society in which social relations  are never represented in an 
“a-historic” manner but rather forged in the evolution of social conflicts and in 
their moral and institutional dimensions12. 
But since the search for individual autonomy is in a constant tension with the 
areas of solidarity, the future of democratic reproduction needs to give shape to some 
sort of alignment between the two, a problem that shows the need for democratic 
experiences to give hope for cooperation. It may be redundant to recognize that the 
efforts to clarify the theoretical and practical foundations needed for democracy have 
been presented in a complex variety of intellectual attempts, often crystallized in 
practical or political demonstrations touting the need for reconstruction. However, it 
can be state that in most Western democracies these efforts turned around some 
dualist debates that had placed in opposite poles the proposals of classic 
republicanism and modern procedimentalism as dominant paradigms in the 
theory and practice of politics (Habermas, 1998). It might be added, bringing some sort 
of geographical and temporal perspective, that much of the Latin American 
countries have been defining socio-political problems through other parochial 
traditions, as in the case of populism13. Even though the fertility contained in such 
discussions, the fact is that the balance had resulted in a greatly simplified opposition 
in which prevails the idea that this antagonist poles are pretty much everything that 
could be said about democracy (Honneth and Farrell, 1998). 
                                                 
12 Once again, Joel Anderson seems to clarify an important dimension of the theory of recognition: “The 
grammar of such struggles is ´moral´ in the sense that the feelings of outrage and indignation driving 
them are generated by the rejection of claims to recognition and thus imply normative judgments about 
the legitimacy of social arrangements. Thus, the normative ideal of a just society empirically is confirmed 
by historical struggles for recognition” Ibid. p. 12. 
13 About the theoretical treatment of the concept of “populism”, see, for instance, Germani, (1965), 
Collier/Collier (1991) and Laclau (2010). 
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Following this judgment, Honneth´s community reaffirm its conception on the 
basis of the social and political thought of John Dewey (1991), the owner 
of an intellectual and practical attitude that set the limits and contours of 
democracy in such a manner that becomes consistent with both republicanism 
and procedimentalism, and even overcomes them. This implies the fact that, in the 
context of a necessary reconstruction of the central dimensions of democracy as 
a "way of life", John Dewey theorized around the possibility of a type of democratic, 
even radically reformer liberalism, not only as an alternative to the 
communist scenario opened by the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Great Depression 
of the '30s or the successive post-war periods, but mainly in front of the historical 
drift of liberalism from its origins to the  "individual-selfishness" within mercantilism 
(including, of course, the laissez faire). Works such as "The Public and its 
Problems" (1927), "Liberalism and Social Action"(1935), "Individualism Old and New" 
(1930) and "Freedom and Culture" (1939), among many others, reflect an intellectual 
attitude and a human predisposition that includes the reorganization of 
the community horizon on the basis of the practical and reflexive reconstruction of 
liberal democracy14. 
John Dewey was in large part the political heir of a specific narrative of 
democracy primarily connoted by the transition, occurred in Great Britain, 
from classical to progressive liberalism. Alan Ryan, in one of the most important 
works on the social and political thought of John Dewey, recognizes this linkage in a 
concise manner: “[…] Dewey´s political views were those of what in Britain was called 
advanced liberalism – politically radical, attached to the rights of women, attached to a 
secular state, siding with labor against capital, but not confiscatory, not ‘impossibilist’, 
not insurrectionary, and in the last resort non particularly socialist if by “socialism” we 
mean attaching great importance to public ownership and the abolition of private 
                                                 
14 Dewey´s treatment of the concept of “public opinion” turns to be clarifying on this topic, since he 
defended the idea of a broaden democracy in a time in which the reproduction of western capitalism 
showed new ways of social control through, for example, mass consumption and mass media. In “The 
Public and its Problems”, Dewey attacked the works of Walter Lippmann (“Public Opinion”, published in 
1922 and “The Phantom Public”, published in 1925) in a well known and surely public debate: while 
Lippmann stated his skepticism over the constitution of a public opinion, Dewey argued that the 
possibilities of a public opinion will depend on the grounds of individual l iberties and the promotion of a 
wider social control over democracy. 
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property in the means of production” (Ryan, 1997:88). As a part of this 
democratic attitude, Dewey conceived that the main task of a new way of 
describing liberalism should appeal to "social intelligence" as a mean of human self-
realization, understood as well as one of the ultimate aims of democratic politics. After 
all, when Honneth says that Dewey aims his thought not to a model of 
"communicative deliberation", but to social cooperation (Honneth e Farrell, 1998), he 
accepts that the Deweyan conception of "social intelligence"15 is clearly compatible 
with the theory of recognition, mainly as an alternative explanation of social and moral 
conflicts16. Here becomes clear that, for both Honneth and Dewey, recognition plays 
an essential role inside the limits of associated life. Ultimately, both of them can claim 
that democracy is the democratic rule of men over men themselves, 
while each individual contributes to the community and is being recognized by it 
according to the social value they bring to the common life. And it is also a form 
of description of social conflicts which states that the struggles for intersubjective 
recognition are the generators of the social pressures that are necessary for the 
establishment of institutions that would guarantee liberty in almost all its forms. 
Finally, we must recognize that, in terms of the arguments 
presented here, there are several dimensions that would eventually be positive for the 
analysis of contemporary politics and its experience. The first of these dimensions is 
that the theory of recognition confronts us with the possibility of conceiving the 
process of identities formation as the ways in which societies identify conflicts and 
                                                 
15 In one of the most remarkable works about the life and mind of John Dewey, Sidney Hook linked  the 
proposal of “social intell igence” with the most vital dimensions of democracy, as for instance the 
individual´s participation in democratic l ife: “The wider use of organized intelligence is possible, 
therefore, only in a truly democratic society. It is possible in such a society because it provides major 
opportunities of mutual consultation, of active participation of all adult minds affected by social politics 
and of voluntary acceptance of proofs and control”. Hook, Sydney. John Dewey: semblanza intelectual, 
Paidós, Barcelona, 2000, p. 114. 
16 A special mention is needed about the republican model  of deliberation that is involved in the 
previous paragraphs. Dewey would agree with Arendt and Habermas in a critique to the old canonic 
l iberal individualism. But while Arent and Habermas argue that the collective will  and individual 
l iberty can only be achieved through various dimensions of communicative action and public 
deliberation, Dewey would rather emphasize than only in terms of a cooperative and intell igent form of 
political deliberation self-development could be achieved. At this level  of cooperation and 
development of the social organism, Dewey finds that the public opinion is inherent to social  l ife, 
considering not very useful to think of government as an isolated sphere, but rather as a "living 
expression" of the reflective forces representing cooperative interests. Honneth and Farrel, 1998: p., 8. 
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imagine solutions. This implies the fact that the chances to re-semanticize the 
shapes of politics from a liberal perspective could be extended to certainly 
unknown places, yet to be explored. This also means that there is still an open 
possibility of achieving a new liberalism that could consider the semantic conditions of 
every liberal "moment" with the aim of building a social order derived from 
cooperation and social intelligence, giving place to the exercise of collective and 
communitarian resolution of social conflicts. John Dewey in his time 
and Axel Honneth in our own days invite us to be convinced, albeit cautiously, that 
among the variety of temperaments cohabitating the vast world of politics, the 
liberal temper can be extremely useful in any humble conversation that is attempting 
to contribute with the coordination of our life as partners. In short, in front of the 
question “can we nowadays uphold some kind of liberal faith?”, the contributions 
of Axel Honneth and John Dewey leave us on a hopeful scenario. 
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